Pragmatic hypotheses in the evolution of science by Esteves, Luis G. et al.
Pragmatic hypotheses in
the evolution of Science
Luís Gustavo Esteves1, Rafael Izbicki2,
Rafael Bassi Stern2, and Julio Michael Stern* 1
1University of São Paulo
2Federal University of São Carlos
December 22, 2018
*Authors’ e-mails: jstern@ime.usp.br, jmstern@hotmail.com (J.M.S., corresponding author);
lesteves@ime.usp.br (L.G.E.); rafaelizbicki@gmail.com (R.I.); rbstern@gmail.com (R.B.S.).
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
09
99
8v
1 
 [s
tat
.O
T]
  2
5 D
ec
 20
18
Abstract
This paper introduces pragmatic hypotheses and relates this concept to the
spiral of scientific evolution. Previous works determined a characterization of
logically consistent statistical hypothesis tests and showed that the modal oper-
ators obtained from this test can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions.
However, despite the importance of precise hypothesis in science, they cannot
be accepted by logically consistent tests. Here, we show that this dilemma can
be overcome by the use of pragmatic versions of precise hypotheses. These
pragmatic versions allow a level of imprecision in the hypothesis that is small
relative to other experimental conditions. The introduction of pragmatic hy-
potheses allows the evolution of scientific theories based on statistical hypothe-
sis testing to be interpreted using the narratological structure of hexagonal spi-
rals, as defined by Pierre Gallais.
1 Introduction
Standard hypothesis tests can lead to immediate logical incoherence, which makes
their conclusions hard to interpret. This incoherence is a result of such tests having
only two possible outcomes. Indeed, Izbicki and Esteves [2015] shows that there
exists no two-valued test that satisfies desirable statistical properties and that is also
logically coherent.
In order to overcome such an impossibility result, Esteves et al. [2016] proposes
agnostic hypothesis tests, which have three possible outputs: (A) accept the hypoth-
esis, say H , (E) reject H , or (Y) remain agnostic about H . These tests can be made
logically coherent while preserving desirable statistical properties. For instance,
both conditions are satisfied by the Generalized Full Bayesian Significance Test (GF-
BST). Furthermore, Stern et al. [2017] shows that the GFBST’s modal operators and
their respective negations can be represented by vertices of the hexagon of opposi-
tions [Blanché, 1966, Béziau, 2012, 2015, Carnielli and Pizzi, 2008, Dubois and Prade,
1982, 2012], which is depicted in fig. 1.
This paper complements the above static representation with an analysis of the
GFBST in the dynamic evolution of scientific theories. The analysis is based on the
metaphor of evolutive hexagonal spirals [Gallais and Pollina, 1974, Gallais, 1982], in
which the logical modalities associated to scientific theories change over time, as in
fig. 2. Our key point in this paradigm is reconciling two apparently contradictory
facts. On the one hand, precise or sharp hypotheses, that is, hypotheses that have a
priori zero probability are central in scientific theories [Stern, 2011b, 2017]. On the
other hand, the GFBST never accepts (A) precise hypotheses. These observations
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Figure 1: Hexagons of Opposition for Statistical Modalities.
lead to the apparent paradox that, if the GFBST were used to test scientific theories,
then the acceptance step in the spiral of scientific theories would be forfeited.
In order to overcome this paradox, we propose the concept of a pragmatic hy-
pothesis associated to a precise hypothesis. While precise hypothesis are commonly
obtained from mathematical theories used in areas of science and technology [Stern,
2011b, 2017], the associated pragmatic hypothesis is an imprecise hypothesis which
is sufficiently good from the practical purpose of an end-user of the theories. For
instance, Newtonian theory assumes a gravitational force of magnitude given by the
equation F = G m1 m2 d−2, where the gravitational constant G has a precise value.
However, the current CODATA (Committee on Data for Science and Technology)
value for the gravitational constant is G = 6.67408(31)× 10−11m3 kg−1 s−2, which
includes a standard deviation for the last signicant digits, 408± 31. Hence, it may
be reasonable for a given end-user to assume that the theoretical form of the last
equation is exact, but that, pragmatically, the constant G can only be known up to a
chosen precision. As a result, one might wish to test an imprecise hypothesis asso-
ciated to the scientific hypothesis of interest [DeGroot and Schervish, 2012, Berger,
2013]
This article advocates for the conceptual distinction between a precise scientific
theory and an associated pragmatic hypotheses. The alternate use of precise and
pragmatic versions of corresponding statistical hypotheses enables the GFBST to
(pragmatically) accept scientific hypotheses. Moreover, this alternate use allows the
GFBST to track the evolution of scientific theories, as interpreted in the context of
Gallais’ hexagonal spirals.
Our main goal in this paper is to formalize testing procedures for a theory taking
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into consideration the level of precision that is appropriate for a given end-user. In
order to handle this problem, we consider the end-user’s predictions about an ex-
periment of his interest. The variation in these predictions can be explained by a
combination of the level of imprecision in the theory and by properties of the end-
user’s experiment. For instance, the latter source of variation is influenced by prop-
erties of the equipment, including precision, accuracy and resolution of measuring
devices [Bucher, 2012, Czichos et al., 2011], and also error bounds for fundamen-
tal constants and calibration factors [Cohen et al., 1957, Cohen, 1957, Lévy-Leblond,
1977, Pakkan and Akman, 1995, Akman and Pakkan, 1996, Wainwright, 2002, Bishop,
2006, Iordanov, 2010, Gelman et al., 2014]. We propose to choose a pragmatic hy-
pothesis in such a way that the imprecision in the end-user’s predictions is mostly
due to his experimental conditions and not due to the level of imprecision in the
theory that he uses.
In order to develop this argument, section 2 first adapts Gallais’s metaphor of
hexagonal spirals to the evolution of science. Next, section 3, proposes three meth-
ods of decomposing the variability in an end-user’s predictions into the level of pre-
cision of the theory he uses and his experimental conditions. Sections 3.1 and 3.2
use these decompositions in order to build pragmatic hypothesis. They build prag-
matic hypotheses for simple hypotheses and then prove that there exists a single
way of extending this construction to composite hypotheses while preserving logi-
cal coherence in simultaneous hypothesis testing. This methodology is illustrated
in section 4. All proofs are found in appendix A.
2 Gallais’ hexagonal spirals and the evolution of science
Following a well-established tradition in structural semantics and narratology [Greimas,
1983, Propp, 2000], Gallais and Pollina [1974] proposes that many classical medieval
tales follow the same organizational pattern. More precisely, these narratives ex-
hibit an underlying intellectual structure and are organized according to an under-
lying archetypal format or prototypical pattern. This pattern includes both static
and a dynamical aspects. From a static perspective, the logical structure of the nar-
rative is such that each arch is represented by a vertex of the hexagon of oppositions
[Blanché, 1966]. The static hexagon of oppositions is depicted in fig. 1 and repre-
sents in each vertex a modal operator among necessity (ä), possibility (♦), contin-
gency (∆) and their negations (¬). These modal operators are structured according
to three axes of opposition (=== ), a triangle of contrariety (−−− ), another triangle
of sub-contrariety, (· · · ), and several edges of subalteration (−→ ). From a dynamical
perspective, the temporal evolution of the narrative follows a spiral (fig. 2) that un-
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Figure 2: Gallais’ evolutionary spiral.
winds (se déroule) around concentric and expanding hexagons of opposition [Gallais
and Pollina, 1974, Gallais, 1982].
Since also the evolution of science can be conceived as following a spiral pattern
[Stern, 2014], its analysis can benefit from the structure in [Gallais and Pollina, 1974,
Gallais, 1982]. From a static perspective, the logical modalities induced by agnostic
hypothesis tests [Stern et al., 2017] can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions.
From a dynamic perspective, scientific theories evolve as a spiral which unwinds
around the following states:
• A1- Extant thesis: This vertex represents a standing paradigm, an accepted theory
using well-known formalisms and familiar concepts, relying on accredited exper-
imental means and methods, etc. In fact, the concepts of a current paradigm may
become so familiar and look so natural that they become part of a reified ontology.
That is, there is a perceived correspondence between concepts of the theory and
dinge-an-sich (things-in-themselves) as seen in nature [Stern, 2011a, 2014].
• U1- Analysis: This vertex represents the moment when some hypotheses of the
standing theory are put in question. At this moment, possible alternatives to the
standing hypotheses may still be only vaguely defined
• E1- Antithesis: This vertex represents the moment when some laws of the stand-
5
ing theory have to be rejected. Such a rejection of old laws may put in question
the entire world-view of the current paradigm, opening the way for revolutionary
ideas, as described in the next vertex.
• O2- Apothesis/ Prosthesis: This vertex is the locus of revolutionary freedom. Al-
ternative models are considered, and specific (precise) forms investigated. There
is intellectual freedom to set aside and dispose of (apothesis) old preconceptions,
prejudices and stereotypes, and also to explore and investigate new paths, to put
together (prosthesis) and try out new concepts and ideas.
• Y2- Synthesis: It is at this vertex that new laws are formulated; this is the point
of Eureka moment(s). A selection of old and and new concepts seem to click into
place, fitting together in the form of new laws, laws that are able to explain new
phenomena and incorporate objects of an expanded reality.
• I2- Enthesis: At this vertex new laws, concepts and methods must enter and be in-
tegrated into a consistent and coherent system. At this stage many tasks are per-
formed in order to combine novel and traditional pieces or to accommodate orig-
inal and conventional components into an well-integrated framework. Finally,
new experimental means and methods are developed and perfected, allowing the
new laws to be corroborated.
• A2- New Thesis: At this vertex, the new theory is accepted as the standard paradigm
that succeeds the preceding one (A1). Acceptance occurs after careful determina-
tion of fundamental constants and calibration factors (including their known pre-
cision), metrological and instrumentational error bounds, etc. At later stages of
maturity, equivalent theoretical frameworks may be developed using alternative
formalisms and ontologies. For example, analytical mechanics offers variational
alternatives that are (almost) equivalent to the classical formulation of Newtonian
mechanics [Abraham and Marsden, 2013]. Usually, these alternative world-views
reinforce the trust and confidence on the underlying laws. Nevertheless, the exis-
tence of such alternative perspectives may also foster exploratory efforts and in-
vestigative works in the next cycle in evolution.
Table 1 applies this spiral structure to the evolution of the theories of orbital as-
tronomy and chemical affinity. The evolution of orbital astronomy has been widely
studied [Hawking, 2004]. The evolution of chemical affinity is presented in greater
detail in Stern [2014], Stern and Nakano [2014].
The above spiral structure highlights that a statistical methodology should be
able to obtain each of the six modalities in the hexagon of oppositions. Before an
acceptance vertex (A) in the hexagon is reached by the spiral of scientific evolution,
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Vertex Orbital astronomy Chemical Affinity
I1- Enthesis/ Ptolemaic/ Copernican Geoffroy affinity table and
A1- Thesis cycles and epicycles highest rank substitution
U1- Analysis Circular or oval orbits? Ordinal or numeric affinity?
E1- Antithesis Non-circular orbits Non-ordinal affinity
O2- Apothesis Elliptic planetary orbits, Integer affinity values,
/Prosthesis focal centering of sun for arithmetic recombination
Y2- Synthesis Kepler laws! Morveau rules and tables!
I2- Enthesis Vortex physics theories, Affinity + stoichiometry
A2- Thesis Keplerian astronomy substitution reactions
U2- Analysis Tangential or radial forces? Total or partial reaction?
E2- Antithesis Non-tangential forces Non-total substitutions
O3- Apothesis Radial attraction forces, Reversible reactions,
/Prosthesis inverse square of distance equilibrium conditions
Y3- Synthesis Newton laws! Mass-Action kinetics!
I3- Enthesis/ Newtonian mechanics & Thermodynamic theories
A3- Thesis variational equivalents for reaction networks
Table 1: Evolution of orbital astronomy and chemical affinity.
theoretically precise or sharp hypotheses must be formulated. However, a logically
coherent hypothesis test, such as the GFBST, can choose solely between rejecting or
remaining agnostic (i.e. corroborating) such sharp hypotheses. Once the evolving
theory becomes (part of) a well-established paradigm, the GFBST can be used with
the goal of accepting non-sharp hypotheses in the context of the same paradigm, a
context that includes fundamental constants and calibration factors (and their re-
spective uncertainties), metrological error bounds, specified accuracies of scientific
intrumentation, etc. The non-sharp versions of sharp hypotheses used in such tests
are called pragmatic, and their formulation is developed in the following sections.
3 Pragmatic hypotheses
In order to derive pragmatic hypotheses from precise ones, it is necessary to define
an idealized future experiment. Let θ be an unknown parameter of interest which is
used to express scientific hypotheses and that takes values in the parameter space,
Θ. A scientific hypothesis takes the form H0 : θ ∈Θ0, where Θ0 ⊂Θ. Whenever there
is no ambiguity, H0 andΘ0 are used interchangeably. Also, the determination of θ is
useful for predicting an idealized future experiment, Z, which takes values inZ . The
uncertainty about Z depends on θ by means of Pθ∗ , the probability measure overZ
when it is known that θ = θ∗, θ∗ ∈Θ.
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Often, it is sufficient for an end-user to determine a pragmatic hypothesis, that
is, that the parameter lies in a set of plausible values, which is larger than the null
hypothesis. This set can be chosen in such a way that the variation over predic-
tions about a future experiment is mostly due to experimental conditions rather
than to the imprecision in the value of the parameter. This section formally develops
a methodology for determining these pragmatic hypotheses.
In order to compare two parameter values, we use a predictive dissimilarity, dZ,
which is a function dZ : Θ×Θ→ R+, such that dZ(θ0,θ∗) measures how much the
predictions made for Z based on θ∗ diverge from the ones made based on θ0. We
define and compare three possible choices for such a dissimilarity.
Definition 3.1. The Kullback-Leibler predictive dissimilarity, KLZ is
KLZ(θ0,θ
∗)=KL(Pθ∗ ,Pθ0 )=
∫
Z
log
(
dPθ∗
dPθ0
)
dPθ∗ ,
that is, KLZ(θ0,θ∗) is the relative entropy between Pθ∗ and Pθ0 .
Example 3.2 (Gaussian with known variance). Let Z = (Z1 . . . , Zd ) ∼ N (θ,Σ0) be a
random vector with a multivariate Gaussian distribution:
dPθ(z)
dz
= ‖2piΣ0‖−0.5 exp
(−0.5(z−θ)tΣ−10 d(z−θ))
KLZ(θ0,θ
∗)=
∫
Rd
log
(
dPθ∗ (z)
dPθ0 (z)
)
dPθ∗ (z)= 0.5(θ0−θ∗)tΣ−10 (θ0−θ∗),
When d = 1 and Σ0 =σ20,
K Lz(θ0,θ
∗)= (θ0−θ
∗)2
2σ20
(1)
The KL dissimilarity evaluates the distance between the predictive probability
distributions for the future experiment under two parameter values, θ0 and θ∗. Al-
though the KL dissimilarity is general, it can be challenging to interpret. In particu-
lar, it can be hard to establish how good are the predictions for Z based on θ∗ when
Z is actually generated from θ0 and K LZ(θ0,θ∗)≤ ². A more interpretable dissimilar-
ity is obtained by taking dZ(θ0,θ∗) to measure how far are the best predictions for Z
based on θ∗ and θ0. In this case, if one makes a prediction for Z based on θ∗, z∗, and
Z was actually generated using θ0, then dZ(θ0,θ∗) ≤ ² guarantees that z∗ will be at
most ² apart from the best possible prediction. Such a dissimilarity is discussed in
the following definition.
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Definition 3.3 (Best prediction dissimilarity - BP). Let Zˆ :Θ→Z be such that Zˆ(θ0)
is the best prediction for Z given that θ = θ0. For example, one can take
Zˆ(θ0)= argmin
z∈Z
δZ,θ0 (z),
where δZ,θ0 :Z →R is such that δZ,θ0 (z) measures how bad z predicts Z when θ = θ0.
The best prediction dissimilarity, BPZ(θ0,θ∗), measures how badly Zˆ(θ∗) predicts Z
relatively to Zˆ(θ0) when θ = θ0. Formally,
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g
(
δZ,θ0 (Zˆ(θ
∗))−δZ,θ0 (Zˆ(θ0))
δZ,θ0 (Zˆ(θ0))
)
,
where g : R −→ R is a motononic function. The choice of g in a particular setting
aims at improving the interpretation of the best prediction dissimilarity criterion.
Example 3.4 (BP under quadratic form). Let Z = Rd , µZ,θ = E[Z|θ], ΣZ,θ = V[Z|θ]
and S be a positive definite matrix. Define the quadratic form induced by S to be
‖z‖2S = zT Sz and
δZ,θ0 (z)=E
[‖Z−z‖2S|θ = θ0]
The optimal prediction under θ∗ is Zˆ(θ∗)=µZ,θ∗ . It follows that
δZ,θ0 (Zˆ(θ
∗))=E[‖Z−µZ,θ∗‖2S|θ = θ0]
= ‖µZ,θ0 −µZ,θ∗‖2S+E
[‖Z−µZ,θ0‖2S|θ = θ0]
In particular, δZ,θ0 (Zˆ(θ0))=E
[‖Z−µZ,θ0‖2S|θ = θ0]. Therefore,
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g
( ‖µZ,θ0 −µZ,θ∗‖2S
E
[‖Z−µZ,θ0‖2S|θ = θ0]
)
(2)
In this example, BPZ can be put in the same scale as Z by taking g (x)=
p
x. Also, two
choices of S are of particular interest. When S=V[Z|θ = θ0]−1, eq. (2) simplifies to
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g
(
d−1‖µZ,θ0 −µZ,θ∗‖2Σ−1Z,θ0
)
(3)
Similarly, when S is the identity matrix, eq. (2) simplifies to
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g
(
‖E[Z|θ = θ0]−E[Z|θ = θ∗]‖22
tr(V[Z|θ = θ0])
)
(4)
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Equation (4) admits an intuitive interpretation. The larger the value of tr(V[Z|θ =
θ0]), the more Z is dispersed and the harder it is to predict its value. Also, ‖E[Z|θ =
θ0]−E[Z|θ = θ∗]‖22 measures how far apart are the best prediction for Z under θ = θ0
and θ = θ∗. That is, BPZ (θ0,θ∗) captures that, if one predicts Z assuming that θ = θ∗
when actually θ = θ0, then the error with respect to the best prediction is increased
as a function of the distance between the predictions over the dispersion of Z.
Example 3.5 (Gaussian with known variance). Consider again Example 3.2 and let
δZ,θ0 (z) be such as in Example 3.4. It follows from eq. (4) that, when S is the identity
matrix,
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g
(
‖θ0−θ∗‖22
tr(Σ0)
)
(5)
Similarly, it follows from eq. (3) that, when S=Σ−10 ,
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)= g (d−1(θ0−θ∗)tΣ−10 (θ0−θ∗)) (6)
Conclude from eq. (6) that, if S=Σ−10 and g (x)= x, then BPZ(θ0,θ∗)= 2d−1KLZ(θ0,θ∗).
Also, when d = 1, Σ0 =σ20 and g (x)=
p
x both eq. (5) and eq. (6) simplify to
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)=σ−10 |θ0−θ∗| (7)
In some situations, Z is the average of m independent observations distributed as
N (θ,Σ0). In this case, Z ∼ N (θ,m−1Σ0). It follows from eq. (5) that BPZ(θ0,θ∗) =
g
(
m‖θ0−θ∗‖22
tr(Σ0)
)
, when S is the identity, and BPZ(θ0,θ∗)= g
(
md−1(θ0−θ∗)tΣ−10 (θ0−θ∗)
)
,
when S=Σ−10 .
Although BPZ is more interpretable then KLZ it also relies on more tuning vari-
ables, such as δ, Zˆ and g . A balance between these features is obtained by a third
predictive dissimilarity, which evaluates how easy it is to recover the value of θ be-
tween θ0 or θ∗ based on Z.
Definition 3.6 (Classification distance - CD). Let θˆθ0,θ∗ :Z →Θ be such that
θˆθ0,θ∗ (z)= arg max
θ∈{θ0,θ∗}
fZ(z|θ)
θˆθ0,θ∗ assigns to each possible outcome of the future experiment z, which value of
θ, θ0 or θ∗, makes the experimental result more likely. The classification distance
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between θ0 and θ∗, CD(θ0,θ∗), is defined as
CD(θ0,θ
∗)= 0.5P(θˆθ0,θ∗ (Z)= θ0|θ0)+0.5P(θˆθ0,θ∗ (Z)= θ∗|θ∗)−0.5
CD(θ0,θ∗)+0.5 is the best Bayes utility in an hypothesis test of θ0 against θ∗ using
a uniform prior for θ and the 0/1 utility [Berger, 2013]. By subtracting 0.5 from this
quantity, CD(θ0,θ∗) varies between 0 and 0.5 and is a distance. Also,
CD(θ0,θ
∗)= 0.5TV(Pθ0 ,Pθ∗ )= 0.25‖Pθ0 −Pθ∗‖1,
where TV(Pθ0 ,Pθ∗ )= supA |Pθ0 (A)−Pθ∗ (A)| and ‖Pθ0−Pθ∗‖1 =
∫
Z |Pθ0 (z)−Pθ∗ (z)|d z
is theL1-distance between probability measures.
Example 3.7 (Gaussian with known variance). Consider Examples 3.2 and 3.5. When
d = 1, Σ0 =σ20, obtain
CDZ(θ0,θ
∗)=Φ
( |θ0−θ∗|
2σ0
)
− 1
2
(8)
Note that, in this case, C D would be the same as BP if, instead of taking g (x)=px,
one chose g (x)=Φ(0.5px)−0.5.
Although analytical expressions for CD are generally not available, it is possible
to approximate it via numerical integration methods.
3.1 Singleton hypotheses
We start by defining the pragmatic hypothesis associated to a singleton hypothesis.
A singleton hypothesis is one in which the parameter assumes a single value, such
as H0 : θ = θ0. In this case, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to H0 is the set of
points whose dissimilarity to θ0 is at most ², as formalized below.
Definition 3.8 (Pragmatic hypothesis for a singleton). Let H0 : θ = θ0, dZ be a predic-
tive dissimilarity function and ²> 0. The pragmatic hypothesis for H0, P g ({θ0},dZ,²),
is
P g ({θ0},dZ,²)= {θ∗ ∈Θ : dZ(θ0,θ∗)≤ ²}
Example 3.9 (Gaussian with known variance). Consider Examples 3.2 and 3.5 when
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d = 1, Σ0 =σ20 and g (x)=
p
x. It follows from eqs. (1), (7) and (8) that
P g ({θ0},BPZ,²)= [θ0−²σ0,θ0+²σ0]
P g ({θ0},K LZ,²)=
[
θ0−
p
2²σ0,θ0+
p
2²σ0
]
P g ({θ0},C DZ,²)=
[
θ0−2Φ−1(0.5+²)σ0,θ0+2Φ−1(0.5+²)σ0
]
Note that the size of each of the pragmatic hypothesis is proportional to σ0. This
occurs because every one of the predictive dissimilarity functions makes the predic-
tion error due to the unknown parameter value small with respect to that due to the
data variability, σ20.
3.2 Composite hypotheses
Next, we consider pragmatic hypotheses for general hypotheses H0 : θ ∈ Θ0, where
Θ0 ⊂Θ.
Definition 3.10. For each hypothesis Θ0 ⊆ Θ, predictive dissimilarity dZ and ² >
0, P g (Θ0,dZ,²) is the pragmatic hypothesis associated to Θ0 induced by dZ and ².
Whenever dZ and ² are clear or not relevant to the result, we write P g (Θ0) instead of
P g (Θ0,dZ,²).
In order to construct these pragmatic hypotheses, we use logically coherent ag-
nostic hypothesis tests. For each hypothesis, an agnostic hypothesis test can either
reject it (1), accept it (0) or remain agnostic (1/2). Esteves et al. [2016] shows that
an agnostic hypothesis test is logically coherent if and only if it is based on a region
estimator. Such tests are presented in Definition 3.12 and illustrated in fig. 3.
Definition 3.11. LetX denote the sample space of the data used to test a hypothe-
sis. A region estimator is a function, R :X −→P (Θ), whereP (Θ) is the power set of
Θ.
Definition 3.12 (Agnostic test based on a region estimator). The agnostic test based
on the region estimator R for testing H0, φRH0 , is such that
φRH0 (x)=

0 , if R(x)⊆H0
1 , if R(x)⊆H c0
1
2 , otherwise.
Besides the logical conditions on the hypothesis test, one might also impose log-
ical restraints on how pragmatic hypotheses are constructed. For instance, let A and
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R(x)
H0H c0
φR (x)= 0
R(x)
H0
H c0
φR (x)= 1
R(x)
H0
H c0
φR (x)= 1/2
Figure 3: φ(x) is an agnostic test based on the region estimator R(x) for testing H0.
B be two hypothesis such that B logically entails A, that is, B ⊆ A. If a logically co-
herent test accepts B , then it also accepts A. This property is called monotonocity
[Izbicki and Esteves, 2015, da Silva et al., 2015, Fossaluza et al., 2017]. One might also
impose that P g is such that, if a logically coherent hypothesis test accepts P g (B),
then it should also accept P g (A). Similarly, let (Ai )i∈I be a collection of hypothesis
which cover A, that is, A ⊆∪i∈I Ai . If a logically coherent hypothesis test rejects ev-
ery Ai , then it rejects A. This property is called union consonance. One might also
impose that P g is such that, if a logically coherent hypothesis test rejects P g (Ai ) for
every i , then it should also reject P g (A). The above conditions define the logical
coherence of a procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses.
Definition 3.13. A procedure for constructing pragmatic hypothesis, P g , is logically
coherent if, for every logically coherent hypothesis test φ and sample point x:
1. If φP g (B)(x)= 0 for some B ⊆ A, then φP g (A)(x)= 0.
2. If φP g (Ai )(x)= 1 for every i ∈ I and A ⊆∪i∈I Ai , then φP g (A)(x)= 1.
In order to motivate the above definition, consider that the frequencies of A A,
AB and BB in a given population are θ1, θ2 and θ3. Note that B := {0.25,0.5,0.25} is a
subset of A = {(p2,2p(1−p), (1−p)2) : p ∈ [0,1]}, which denotes the Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium. That is, if the frequencies A A, AB and BB are, respectively, 0.25, 0.5
and 0.25, then the population follows the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. As a result,
if one pragmatically accepts that the population satisfies the specified proportions,
then one might also wish to pragmatically accept that the population follows the
Hardy-Weinberg. Similarly, if one pragmatically rejects for every p ∈ [0,1] that the
frequencies of A A, AB and BB are, respectively, p2, 2p(1− p) and (1− p)2, then
one might also wish to pragmatically reject that the population follows the Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium. These conditions are assured in Definition 3.13.
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In a logically coherent procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses, the
pragmatic hypothesis associated to a composite hypothesis is completely determined
by the pragmatic hypotheses associated to simple hypotheses. This result is pre-
sented in Theorem 3.14.
Theorem 3.14. A procedure for constructing pragmatic hypothesis, P g , is logically
coherent if and only if, for every hypothesisΘ0, P g (Θ0)=⋃θ∈Θ0 P g ({θ}).
Using Theorem 3.14 it is possible to determine a logically coherent procedure for
constructing pragmatic hypotheses by determining only the pragmatic hypothesis
associated to simple hypothesis, such as in section 3.1. Theorem 3.14 is illustrated
in section 4.
Besides being logically coherent, it is often desirable in statistics [Pereira and
Stern, 2008, Stern and Pereira, 2014] and in science [Stern, 2011b, 2017] for a pro-
cedure to be invariant to reparametrization. That is, that the procedure reaches the
same conclusions whatever the coordinate system is used to specify both the sample
and the parameter spaces. For instance, the pragmatic hypothesis that is obtained
using the International metric system should be compatible to the one that is ob-
tained using the English metric system. Invariance to reparametrization is formally
presented in Definition 3.16.
Definition 3.15.
(
P∗
θ∗
)
θ∗∈Θ∗ is a reparameterization of (Pθ)θ∈Θ if there exists a bijec-
tive function, f :Θ→Θ∗, such that for every θ ∈Θ, Pθ =P∗f (θ).
Definition 3.16. Let
(
P∗
θ∗
)
θ∗∈Θ∗ be a reparametrization of (Pθ)θ∈Θ by a bijective func-
tion, f :Θ→Θ∗. Also, let dZ and d∗Z be predictive dissimilarity functions. The func-
tions dZ and d∗Z are invariant to the reparametrization if for every logically coherent
procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses, P g ,
f [P g (Θ0,dZ,²)]= P g ( f [Θ0],d∗Z ,²),
Definition 3.16 states that, ifΘ0 is an hypothesis and invariance to reparametriza-
tion holds, then the pragmatic hypothesis obtained in a reparametrization ofΘ0, say
P g ( f [Θ0]), is the same as the transformed pragmatic hypothesis associated to Θ0,
f [P g (Θ0)]. Theorem 3.17 presents a sufficient condition for obtaining invariance to
reparametrization.
Theorem 3.17. Let
(
P∗
θ∗
)
θ∗∈Θ∗ be a reparameterization of (Pθ)θ∈Θ given by a bijec-
tive function, f . If dZ and d∗Z satisfy dZ(θ0,θ) = d∗Z ( f (θ0), f (θ)), then dZ and d∗Z are
invariant to this reparametrization.
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Corollary 3.18. If dZ and d∗Z are the same choice between KL, BP or CD, then dZ and
d∗Z are invariant to every reparametrization.
The procedures for constructing pragmatic hypotheses induced by K L and C D
also satisfy an additional property given by Theorem 3.19.
Theorem 3.19. Let Zm = (Z1, . . . , Zm), where Zi ’s are i.i.d. Fθ and (Fθ)θ∈Θ is identifi-
able [Casella and Berger, 2002, Wechsler et al., 2013]. Also, let K Lm and C Dm be the
dissimilarities calculated using Zm . If P g is logically coherent then, for every Θ0 ⊆Θ
and ²> 0,
(i)
(
P g (Θ0,K Lm ,²)
)
m≥1 and
(
P g (Θ0,C Dm ,²)
)
m≥1 are non-increasing sequences of
sets
(ii) P g (Θ0,K Lm ,²)
m→∞−−−−→Θ0 and P g (Θ0,C Dm ,²) m→∞−−−−→Θ0.
Theorem 3.19 states that the sequence of pragmatic hypotheses for Θ0 induced
by dZm is non-increasing if the dissimilarity is evaluated by either KL or CD. The
greater the number of observable quantities Zm , the easier it is to distinguish two
parameter values θ0 and θ∗ and, therefore, the smaller the amount of parameters
that are taken as close to θ0. Also, as the sample size goes to infinity, the pragmatic
hypothesis associated to Θ0 converges to to Θ0. In other words, for each θ0 ∈ Θ0,
no other parameter value can predict infinitely many observable quantities with a
precision sufficiently close to that of θ0.
4 Applications
In the following, pragmatic hypotheses for standard statistical problems are derived.
Example 4.1 (Gaussian with unknown variance). Consider the setting from Exam-
ple 3.9, but with σ2 unknown and 0 < σ2 ≤ M 2. In this case, the parameter is θ =
(µ,σ2). Consider the composite hypothesis H0 : {µ0}× (0, M 2], which is often written
as H0 : µ= µ0. In this case let θ0 = (µ0,σ20) and Θ0 = {µ0}× (0, M 2]. Proceeding as in
Example 3.9, it follows that
P g ({θ0},BPZ,²)= [µ0−²σ0,µ0+²σ0]× (0, M 2]
P g (Θ0,BPZ,²)= [µ0−²M ,µ0+²M ]× (0, M 2] Theorem 3.14
The rectangular shape of these pragmatic hypotheses seems to be unreasonable as,
for instance, whether a point (µ,σ2) is close to (µ0,σ20) does not depend on σ
2
0. This
is a consequence of the choice of δ in Example 3.9.
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Figure 4: Pragmatic hypotheses in Example 4.1 for H0 : µ = 0 with KL (upper), CD
(lower), ²= 0.1, and M 2 = 2. H0 is represented by a red line in all figures.
Figure 4 presents the pragmatic hypotheses for H0 : µ = 0,σ2 = 1 and H0 : µ = 0
when ² = 0.1 and M 2 = 2, and using the KL and CD dissimilarities. Contrary to BP,
the hypotheses obtained from these dissimilarities do not have a rectangular shape.
In particular, the triangular shape of the pragmatic hypotheses for H0 :µ= 0 is such
that the closer σ2 is to 0, the smaller the range of values for µ that are included in
the pragmatic hypothesis. This behavior might be desirable since, when σ2 is small,
there is little uncertainty about the value of Z and, consequently, a narrow interval
of values of µ can predict Z with precision ².
Example 4.2 (Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium). Let Z ∼Multinomial(m,θ), where θ =
(θ1,θ2,θ3), θi ≥ 0, and ∑3i=1θi = 1. The Hardy-Weinberg (HW) hypothesis [Hardy,
2003], H0, which is depicted in the red curve in fig. 5 satisfies
H0 : θ ∈Θ0, Θ0 =
{(
p2,2p(1−p), (1−p)2) : 0≤ p ≤ 1}
If θp0 = (p2,2p(1− p), (1− p)2), δZ(z) = E[‖Z− z‖22|θ = θ
p
0 ] and g (x) =
p
x, then it
follows from Example 3.4 that
BPZ(θ
p
0 ,θ
∗)=
(
m× (θ1−p
2)2+ (θ2−2p(1−p))2+ (θ3− (1−p)2)2
p2(1−p2)+2p(1−p)(1−2p(1−p))+ (1−p)2(1− (1−p)2)
)0.5
The pragmatic hypotheses that are obtained using K L, BP and C D for the HW hy-
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Figure 5: Pragmatic hypotheses obtained for the HW equilibrium, depicted in red,
using m = 20, ² = 0.1 for BP and CD and ² = 0.01 for KL. The blue regions indicate
the pragmatic hypothesis for HW and p = 13 (top) and for HW (bottom). The lower,
middle and right panels were obtained, respectively, with BP, KL and CD. The green
regions in the right panels represents 80% HPD regions for the genotype distribution
of each of the eight groups collected by Brentani et al. [2011] and two simulated
datasets.
pothesis are depicted in fig. 5. The choice between BP or KL and CD has a large
impact over the shape of the pragmatic hypotheses. While for BP the width of the
pragmatic hypothesis is approximately uniform along the HW curve, the width of
the pragmatic hypotheses obtained using K L and C D is smaller towards the edges
of the HW curve. This behavior could be expected since, towards the edges of the
HW curve, Z has the smallest variability. The figure also depicts the challenge in cal-
ibrating K L. While the pragmatic hypotheses for BP and C D have similar sizes when
using ²= 0.1, this result was obtained for K L while using ²= 0.01. The pragmatic hy-
potheses in fig. 5 are further tested using data from Brentani et al. [2011], which is
presented in table 2. This study had the goal of verifying association between the
APOE-²4 gene and Alzheimer disease. The lower panels of Figure 5 present the 80%
HPD regions for the distribution of this gene in each of the eight groups observed
in the study. Additionally, they present two simulated datasets, 9 and 10. Groups
9 and 10 were generated by populations that were, respectively, not under and un-
der the HW equilibrium. Group 9 and 10 fall, respectively, outside and inside of the
pragmatic hypothesis.
Example 4.3 (Bioequivalence). Assume that Z = (X ,Y ) ∼ N ((µ1,µ2),σ2I2), with σ
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AA AD DD Decision
1 4 18 94 Agnostic
2 6 53 74 Accept
3 57 118 100 Agnostic
4 58 97 48 Agnostic
5 120 361 194 Agnostic
6 206 309 142 Accept
7 110 148 44 Accept
8 34 22 12 Agnostic
9 198 282 520 Reject
10 641 314 45 Accept
Table 2: Genotype counts for the eight groups in Brentani et al. [2011]. Also, the
decision of the GFBST agnostic hypothesis test [Esteves et al., 2016] for testing in
each group the pragmatic Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium hypothesis with m = 20. The
decisions are the same for K L, BP and C D .
known. We derive the pragmatic hypothesis for H0 : µ1 = µ2, that is, for {(µ1,µ2) ∈
R2 :µ1 =µ2}. Such a test might be used in a bioequivalence study, where X and Y are
the concentrations of an active ingredient in a generic (test) drug medication and in
the brand-name (reference) medication [Chow et al., 2016], respectively. Since H0 is
composite, it is helpful to derive the pragmatic hypothesis of its constituents.
In order to do so, let θ0 = (µ0,µ0), µ0 ∈ R, θ∗ = (µ∗1 ,µ∗2 ), and Hθ0 : θ = θ0. If
δZ,θ∗ (z)=E
[
(X −z1)2+ (Y −z2)2|θ = θ∗
]
and g (x)=px, then
BPZ(θ0,θ
∗)=
√
(µ∗1 −µ0)2+ (µ∗2 −µ0)2
2σ2
Hence, P g ({θ0},BPZ,²) =
{
(µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ) : (µ
∗
1 −µ0)2+ (µ∗2 −µ0)2 ≤ 2²2σ2
}
which is a circle
with center (µ0,µ0) and radius
p
2²σ, as depicted on the left panel of fig. 6. In this
case, the pragmatic hypothesis is the Tier 1 Equivalence Test hypothesis suggested
by the US Food and Drug Administration [Chow et al., 2016]. The pragmatic hypoth-
esis for H0 : µ1 = µ2 is obtained by taking the union of the pragmatic hypotheses
associated to its constituents, as illustrated in the right panel of fig. 6. Specifically,
P g (H0,BPZ,²)=
{
(µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ) : |µ∗2 −µ∗1 | ≤ ²σ
}
The pragmatic hypothesis for H0 using KL is obtained similarly. Note that
KLZ(θ0,θ
∗)= 0.5BP2Z(θ0,θ∗)
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(a) H0 :µ1 =µ2 =µ0. (b) H0 :µ1 =µ2.
Figure 6: Pragmatic hypotheses using BP in Example 4.3 when σ is known.
Therefore, P g ({θ0},K LZ,²)=
{
(µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ) : (µ
∗
1 −µ0)2+ (µ∗2 −µ0)2 ≤ 2²σ2
}
and
P g (H0,K LZ,²)= P g (H0,K LZ,0.5²2)
The pragmatic hypothesis for H0 that is obtained using CD has no analytic ex-
pression. However, by observing that N (µ,σ2) = µ+σN (0,1), it is possible to show
that, there exists a monotonically increasing function, h :R−→R, such that
P g (H0,C DZ,0.5²
2)= {(µ∗1 ,µ∗2 ) : |µ∗2 −µ∗1 | ≤ h(²)σ}
That is, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to H0 have the same shape as in the
right panel of fig. 6. They differ solely on how many standard deviations correspond
to the width of the pragmatic hypothesis.
5 Final Remarks
The spiral structure studied in [Gallais and Pollina, 1974] can be used to describe
scientific evolution. However, in order for the analogy to be complete, it is neces-
sary to indicate what types of scientific theories or hypotheses are effectively tested
in the acceptance vertex of the hexagon of oppositions. We defend that these are
pragmatic hypotheses, which are sufficiently precise for the end-user of the theory.
In order to make this statement formal, we introduce three methods for con-
structing a pragmatic hypothesis associated to a precise hypothesis. These methods
are based on three predictive dissimilarity functions: KL, BP and CD. Each of these
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methods have different advantages. For instance, the scale of BP and CD is more
interpretable than KL, making it easier to determine whether the former are large
or small. On the other hand, BP relies on the definition of more functions than KL
and CD, such as δZ,θ0 (z) in Definition 3.3. If these function are chosen inadequately,
then the shape of the resultant pragmatic hypothesis might be counter-intuitive or
meaningless. Finally, CD often does not have an analytic expression. It relies on nu-
merical integration over the sample space, which can be taxing in high dimensions.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.14. Let P g be logically coherent. Pick an arbitrary θ0 ∈ Θ0 and
note that, if R(x) ≡ P g ({θ0}), then φRP g ({θ0})(x) = 0. Since P g is logically coherent,
conclude that φRP g (Θ0)(x)≡ 0, that is, P g ({θ0})⊆ P g (Θ0). Since θ0 ∈Θ0 was arbitrary,
conclude that
⋃
θ0∈Θ0
P g ({θ0})⊆ P g (Θ0) (9)
Next, let R(x) ≡ ⋂θ0∈Θ0 P g ({θ0})c . For every θ0 ∈ Θ0, φRP g ({θ0})(x) = 1. Since P g is
logically coherent, φRP g (Θ0) ≡ 1, that is, P g (Θ0)⊆Rc ≡
⋃
θ0∈Θ0 P g ({θ0}). Conclude that
P g (Θ0)⊆
⋃
θ0∈Θ0
P g ({θ0}) (10)
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It follows from Equations (9) and (10) that P g (Θ0) =⋃θ0∈Θ0 P g ({θ0}). It also follows
from direct calculation that, if P g (Θ0)=⋃θ0∈Θ0 P g ({θ0}), then P g is logically coher-
ent.
Proof of Theorem 3.17. LetΘ0 ⊆Θ
P g ( f [Θ0],d
∗
Z ,²)= {θ∗ ∈Θ∗ : ∃θ∗0 ∈ f [Θ0] s.t. d∗Z (θ∗,θ∗0 )≤ ²}
= {θ∗ ∈Θ∗ : ∃θ∗0 ∈ f [Θ0] s.t. dZ( f −1(θ∗), f −1(θ∗0 ))≤ ²}
= f [{θ ∈Θ : ∃θ0 ∈Θ0 s.t. dZ(θ,θ0)≤ ²}]
= f [P g (Θ0,dZ,²)]
Proof of Theorem 3.19. Since the Zi ’s are i.i.d., KLm(θ0,θ∗) = mKLZ1 (θ0,θ∗). It fol-
lows that
P g (Θ0,K Lm ,²)=
⋃
θ0∈Θ0
P g ({θ0},KLm ,²)
= ⋃
θ0∈Θ0
P g ({θ0},mKLZ1 ,²)=
⋃
θ0∈Θ0
{
θ∗ ∈Θ : K LZ1 (θ0,θ∗)≤m−1²
}
Thus,
(
P g (Θ0,K Lm ,²)
)
m≥1 is a non-increasing sequence of sets. It follows that
lim
m→∞P g (Θ0,K Lm ,²)=
⋂
m≥1
⋃
θ0∈Θ0
{
θ∗ ∈Θ : KLZ1 (θ0,θ∗)≤m−1²
}
= ⋃
θ0∈Θ0
⋂
m≥1
{
θ∗ ∈Θ : KLZ1 (θ0,θ∗)≤m−1²
}
= ⋃
θ0∈Θ0
{
θ∗ ∈Θ : KLZ1 (θ0,θ∗)= 0
}
= ⋃
θ0∈Θ0
{θ0}=Θ0
where the next-to-last equality follows from the assumption that (Fθ)θ∈Θ is identi-
fiable. The proofs for the C D divergence follows from the fact that TV(Pθ0 ,Pθ∗ ) ≤√
KL(Pθ0 ,Pθ∗ ).
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